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Abstract— The well-known Sliding Window protocol
caters for the reliable and efficient transmission of data
over unreliable channels that can lose, reorder and dupli-
cate messages. Despite the practical importance of the pro-
tocol and its high potential for errors, it has never been for-
mally verified for the general setting. We try to fill this gap
by giving a fully formal specification and verification of an
improved version of the protocol. The protocol is specified
by a timed state machine in the language of the verification
system PVS. This allows a mechanical check of the proof by
the interactive proof checker of PVS. Our modelling is very
general and includes such important features of the protocol
as sending and receiving windows of arbitrary size, bounded
sequence numbers and the three types of channel faults men-
tioned above.
Keywords— distributed networks, communication proto-
cols, formal specification, mechanized verification, PVS
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliable transmission of data over unreliable channels
is an old and well-studied problem in computer science.
Without a satisfactory solution, computer networks would
be useless, because they transmit data over channels that
often lose, duplicate or reorder messages. One of the most
efficient protocols for reliable transmission is the Sliding
Window (SW) protocol [20]. Many popular communica-
tion protocols such as TCP and HDLC are based on the
SW protocol.
Communication protocols usually involve a subtle inter-
action of a number of distributed components and have a
high degree of parallelism. This is why their correctness
is difficult to ensure, and many protocols turned out to be
erroneous. One of the most promising solutions to this
problem is the use of formal verification, which requires
the precise specification of the protocol in some specifi-
cation language and a formal proof of its correctness by
mathematical techniques. Formal verification is especially
This research is supported by the PROGRESS project EES5202,
“Modelling and performance analysis of telecommunication systems”.
useful when it uses some form of mechanical support, such
as a model checker or an interactive theorem prover.
However, formal verification of communication proto-
cols is notoriously difficult. Although a number of speci-
fication and verification techniques exist, including Hoare
logic [11], temporal logic [15], automata [14] and process
algebra [3], many of them have only been applied to toy
examples. Even verification of a version of the Alternating
Bit protocol [4] (which is one of the simplest communica-
tion protocols), namely the bounded retransmission proto-
col (BRP) turned out to be nontrivial. The use of model
checking for verification of the BRP is problematic due to
the infinite state space of the protocol (caused by unbound-
edness of the message data, the retransmission bound, and
the file length), and mechanization of the correctness proof
by interactive theorem provers revealed many technical
difficulties [8], [10], [9].
Despite the practical significance of the Sliding Win-
dow protocol, relatively little has been done on its formal
verification. Stenning [20] only gave an informal manual
proof for his protocol. A semi-formal manual proof is also
presented in [13], and some versions of the protocol have
been model-checked for small parameter values in [16],
[12], [7]. The combination of abstraction techniques and
model-checking in [19] allowed to verify the SW protocol
for a relatively large window size of 16 (which is still a few
orders less than a possible window size in TCP). The ver-
ifications [16], [12], [7], [19] assume data link channels,
which can only lose messages. The protocols for such
channels, called data link protocols, are important (they
include, e.g., HDLC, SLIP and PPP protocols), but they
are only used for transmission of data over relatively short
distances.
In this paper, we study the verification of sliding win-
dow protocols for more general transport channels, which
can also reorder and duplicate messages. Such channels
are already considered in the original paper on the SW
protocol by Stenning [20]. The protocols for such chan-
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nels (called transport protocols), such as TCP, can transmit
data over very large networks such as Internet.
Note that not for all types of transport channels a SW
protocol exists. As [2] shows, for a fully asynchronous
system and channels that can both lose and reorder mes-
sages, it is impossible to design an efficient transmission
protocol that uses bounded sequence numbers. Similar re-
sult is proved for systems that can both reorder and dupli-
cate messages [23]. In [18], unbounded sequence numbers
are assumed for verification of the SW protocol for trans-
port channels. This makes the verification rather simple,
because it is known that the repetition of sequence num-
bers is the main source of errors for SW protocols [22].
Unfortunately, transmission protocols that use un-
bounded sequence numbers are usually not practical. Be-
cause of the impossibility results mentioned above, a SW
protocol for transport channels with bounded sequence
numbers can only be designed for systems, in which each
message in a channel has a maximum lifetime1. Such a
SW protocol is a part of the TCP protocol, which oper-
ates over transport channels with a given maximum packet
lifetime. The theoretical basis of that protocol is presented
in [21]. TCP uses 232 sequence numbers, which is enough
to represent 4 gigabytes of data. The transmission mecha-
nism of TCP uses a complicated timing mechanism to im-
plement sequence numbers in such a way that their period-
ical repetition does not cause ambiguity. It often requires
the sender and the receiver to synchronize on the sequence
numbers they use. Such synchronization is provided by
the three-way handshake protocol, which is not a part of
the SW protocol and correctness of which is not easy to
ensure. In general, the transmission mechanism of TCP
seems too complicated and too specific for TCP to serve
as a good starting point for verification of SW protocols
for transport channels.
Another approach is chosen in [17]. Shankar presents a
version of the SW protocol for transport channels with the
maximum packet lifetime, which does not require any syn-
chronization between the sender and the receiver, and also
does not impose any restrictions on the transmission pol-
icy. However, the range of sequence numbers, required to
ensure the correctness of his protocol, depends on the max-
imum transmission rate of the sender. In the case of TCP,
his protocol would only work correctly if the sender did
not send into the channel more than some 30 megabytes of
data per second (if we take 120 seconds for the maximum
packet lifetime in TCP, as in [22]). Such restriction may
not be practical for modern networks, which are getting
1Such protocols can also be designed for untimed systems which
limit the reordering of messages in a channel [13], but such systems
seem to be only of theoretical interest.
faster every year. Indeed, the range of sequence numbers
in a large industrial protocol like TCP is fixed. Therefore,
if the available transmission rate at some point exceeds our
expectations, we would need to re-design the whole proto-
col to allow for faster transmission, which may be costly.
From the formal point of view, the need to reason about
the maximum transmission rate made the verification of
Shankar’s protocol in [17] very large and complicated.
In this paper, we present a new version of the SW
protocol for transport channels. In our opinion, it com-
bines some of the best features of the transmission mech-
anism of TCP and Shankar’s protocol. We do not re-
quire any synchronization between the sender and the re-
ceiver. Maximum packet lifetime and appropriate trans-
mission and acknowledgment policies are used to ensure
the correct recognition of sequence numbers. These poli-
cies are rather simple; roughly speaking, they require the
sender (receiver) to stop and wait for the maximum packet
lifetime after sending (receiving) the maximum sequence
number. Unlike some previous works [20], [17], the range
of sequence numbers used by our protocol does not depend
on the transmission rate of the sender. Therefore, between
the required periods of waiting, the sender may transmit
data arbitrarily fast, even if the range of sequence num-
bers is fixed2, e.g. as in TCP. If implemented for TCP, our
protocol would allow to transmit files up to 4 gigabytes
arbitrarily fast.
Even for relatively simple communication protocols
such as a One-bit Sliding Window protocol [5], manual
formal verification is so lengthy and complicated that it
can easily be erroneous. This is why we need some form
of mechanical support. Despite its relative simplicity, our
protocol highly depends on complex data structures. It also
uses several parameters of arbitrary size, such as the win-
dow size and the range of sequence numbers. Hence com-
pletely automatic verification is not feasible for us. This is
why we use an interactive theorem prover. We have chosen
PVS [1], because we have an extensive experience with it
and successfully applied it to verification of several com-
plicated protocols [6]. PVS, which is based on a higher-
order logic, has a convenient specification language and is
relatively easy to learn and to use.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II, we give an informal description of our protocol. In
section III, we formalize the protocol by a timed state ma-
chine. Section IV outlines the proof of correctness prop-
erty for our protocol. Some concluding remarks are given
2Of course, the average transmission rate of our protocol over the
long run does depend on the range of sequence numbers, because the
fewer sequence numbers the protocol has, the more often it has to stop
and wait after the maximum number.
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in section V.
II. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
Sender and receiver. In a SW protocol, there are
two main components: the sender and the receiver. The
sender obtains an infinite sequence of data from the send-
ing host. We call indivisible blocks of data in this sequence
“frames”, and the sequence itself the “input sequence”.
The input sequence must be transmitted to the receiver via
an unreliable network. After receiving the frames, the re-
ceiver eventually delivers them to the receiving host. The
correctness condition for a SW protocol says that the re-
ceiver should deliver the frames to the receiving host in
the same order in which they appear in the input sequence.
Messages and channels. In order to transmit a frame,
the sender puts it into a frame message together with some
additional information, and sends it to the frame channel.
After the receiver eventually receives the frame message
from this channel, it sends an acknowledgment message
for the corresponding frame back to the sender. This ac-
knowledgment message is transmitted via the acknowledg-
ment channel. After receiving an acknowledgment mes-
sage, the sender knows that the corresponding frame has
been received by the receiver. Thus the communication
between the sender and the receiver is bi-directional; the
sender transmits frames to the receiver via the frame chan-
nel, and the receiver transmits acknowledgments for these
frames to the sender via the acknowledgment channel.
Sequence numbers. The sender sends the frames in
the same order in which they appear in its input sequence.
However, the frame channel is unreliable, so the receiver
may receive these frames in a very different order (if re-
ceive at all). Therefore it is clear that each frame message
must contain some information about the order of the cor-
responding frame in the input sequence. Such additional
information is called “sequence number”. If we include
as a sequence number the exact position of the frame in
the input sequence, it would make sequence numbers used
by our protocol unbounded (because conceptually the in-
put sequence is infinite). As we already explained in the
introduction, unbounded sequence numbers are not prac-
tical. This is why in a SW protocol, instead of the ex-
act position of the frame in the input sequence, the sender
sends the remainder of this position with respect to some
fixed modulus K. The value of K varies greatly among
protocols: it is only 16 for the Mascara protocol for wire-
less ATM networks, but 232 for TCP. To acknowledge a
frame, the receiver sends in the acknowledgment message
the sequence number for which the frame was received.
It should be noted that acknowledgments are “accumula-
tive”; for example, when the sender acknowledges a frame
with sequence number 3, it means that frames with se-
quence numbers 0, 1 and 2 have also been received.
Sending and receiving windows. At any time, the
sender maintains a sequence of sequence numbers corre-
sponding to frames it is permitted to send. These frames
are said to be a part of the sending window. Similarly, the
receiver maintains a receiving window of sequence num-
bers it is permitted to receive. In our protocol, the sizes of
sending and receiving windows are equal and represented
by an arbitrary integer N.
At some point during the execution it is possible that
some frames in the beginning of the sending window are
already sent, but not yet acknowledged, and the remain-
ing frames are not sent yet. When an acknowledgment
arrives for a frame in the sending window that is already
sent, this frame and all preceding frames are removed from
the window as acknowledgments are accumulative. Simul-
taneously, the window is shifted forward, such that it again
contains N frames. As a result, more frames can be sent ei-
ther immediately or later. Acknowledgments that fall out-
side the window are discarded. If a sent frame is not ac-
knowledged for a long time, it usually means that either
this frame or an acknowledgment for it has been lost. To
ensure the progress of the protocol, such frame is even-
tually resent. Many different policies for sending and re-
sending of frames exist [22], which take into account, e.g.,
the efficient allocation of resources and the need to avoid
network congestion. Here we are only concerned with the
correctness of the protocol, so we abstract from the de-
tails of the transmission policy and specify only those re-
strictions on protocol’s behaviour that are needed to ensure
safety.
During the execution, the receiving window is usually
a mix of sequence numbers corresponding to frames that
have been received out of order and sequence numbers cor-
responding to “empty spaces”, i.e. frames that are still ex-
pected. When a frame arrives with a sequence number
corresponding to some empty space, it is inserted in the
window, otherwise it is discarded. At any time, if the first
element of the receiving window is a frame, it can be de-
livered to the receiving host, and the window is shifted by
one. The sequence number of the last delivered frame can
be sent back to the sender to acknowledge the frame (for
convenience reasons, in this version we acknowledge de-
livered frames instead of received frames). It should be
noted that not every frame must be acknowledged; it is
possible to deliver a few frames in a row and then acknowl-
edge only the last of them.
20
Potential ambiguity. It is shown in [22], that for data
link channels we need K  2  N to ensure the unam-
biguous recognition of sequence numbers. However, for
transport channels this condition is not sufficient. Indeed,
suppose that window size N  1 and we use K  2 se-
quence numbers, so we only have sequence numbers 0 and
1. Suppose the sender sends the first two frames f 0 and
f 1 to the receiver, which are successfully received, deliv-
ered and acknowledged. Suppose, however, that the first
of these frames has been duplicated in the frame buffer, so
the buffer still contains frame f 0 with sequence number
0. The receiver now has 0 in its window, so it can receive
frame f 0 for the second time, violating the safety property.
This simple example clearly shows that we need addi-
tional restrictions on the protocol to recognize sequence
numbers correctly. Traditional approaches [20], [17] in-
troduce a stronger restriction on K, which essentially has
the form K  2  N  f  Rmax 	 Lmax 
 , where Rmax is
the maximum transmission rate of the sender, Lmax is the
maximum message lifetime in the frame and acknowledg-
ment channels, and f is some function. As we already
explained in the introduction, such dependence between
the range of sequence numbers and the maximum trans-
mission rate is undesirable. This is why in our protocol
we only require K  2  N, but introduce timing restric-
tions on the transmission and acknowledgment policies to
ensure that frames and acknowledgments are not received
more than once. These timing restrictions of our protocol
are explained below.
A. Timing restrictions
In our protocol, the sender is allowed to resend sequence
number 0 and all subsequent sequence numbers only af-
ter more than Lmax time units have passed since the re-
ceipt of the acknowledgment for the maximum sequence
number K  1. This is necessary to ensure that when se-
quence number 0 is resent, all “old” acknowledgments, i.e.
those for frames preceding the current frame, are already
removed from the acknowledgment channel (because their
timeouts expired), and cannot be mistaken for “new” ac-
knowledgments, i.e. those for the current frame and its suc-
cessors.
Similarly, the receiver is allowed to receive sequence
number 0 and all subsequent sequence numbers for any
time but the first only after more than Lmax time units have
passed since the delivery of a frame with the maximum se-
quence number K  1. This is necessary to ensure that all
“old” frames are already removed from the frame chan-
nel and cannot be mistaken for “new” frames. To imple-
ment these restrictions, our protocol keeps two variables
tackmax and tdelmax, expressing the time when we re-
ceived an acknowledgment for sequence number K  1,
and, delivered a frame with sequence number K  1, re-
spectively.
We were surprised to discover during the verification,
that these restrictions are not quite sufficient to guarantee
the unambiguous recognition of sequence numbers. It is
the acknowledgment for the maximum sequence number
K  1 that causes the problem. In the initial version of
the protocol, all acknowledgments could be resent at any
time (by resending we mean here sending an acknowledg-
ment for the same frame more than once, not just repe-
tition of a sequence number). Suppose that between the
receipt of an acknowledgment for sequence number K  1
and the sending of sequence number 0 by the sender, the
acknowledgment for sequence number K  1 is resent by
the receiver. Then this acknowledgment may still be in the
channel at the time when sequence number 0 is sent by
the sender (remember that all other acknowledgments are
eliminated from the channel during the timeout period).
As a result, this “old” acknowledgment may eventually be
mistaken for a newly sent acknowledgment. So, the sender
will think that a frame with sequence number K  1 is ac-
knowledged, whereas in fact it could have been lost.
We constructed a (lengthy) scenario in which such in-
correct receipt of acknowledgments eventually leads to in-
correct receipt of frames and violation of the safety prop-
erty. To fix this error, in the revised version of the protocol
we do not allow to acknowledge a particular frame with
sequence number K  1 more than once. Considering that
acknowledgments can be lost, this results in a possibility
of deadlock. We are not very concerned about this, since
in any reasonable implementation of the SW protocol, it is
only allowed to resent a message if there is a strong suspi-
cion that the original message has been lost. In our proto-
col, we prefer to abstract away from such implementation
details.
III. FORMAL SPECIFICATION
A. Data structures
First we define the data structure of the protocol. For
the sender, the window “slides” over the infinite input se-
quence input. We do not specify the nature of the frames in
the input sequence. Variable f irst denotes the first frame
in the sending window, f tsend is the first frame that is
not sent yet, and we always have first  s0 
 ftsend  s0 

first  s0 
 N. Thus, at any moment of time, frames with
indices from f irst to f tsend  1 (if any) are already sent
but not yet acknowledged, and frames with indices from
f tsend to f irst  N  1 (if any) are in the sending win-
dow but not yet sent. Variable tackmax expresses the time
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when we received the acknowledgment with the maximum
sequence number K  1 for the last time. As a time domain
Time, we take the set of non-negative real numbers.
Sender:
1) input : sequence Frames  ,
2) first : nat,
3) ftsend : nat,
4) tackmax : Time
For the receiver, out put is the output sequence, buffer
is a record with two fields snumber and f rn, that repre-
sents the receiving window with N elements (which are ei-
ther frames or empty spaces, denoted by ε), lastdel is the
last delivered sequence number, acklastdel is a boolean
variable which tells whether we are allowed to send the
acknowledgment for lastdel to the sender, delmax is a
boolean variable which tells whether we already deliv-
ered the maximum sequence number K  1 at least once,
and variable tdelmax expresses the time when we deliv-
ered the frame with the maximum sequence number K  1
for the last time (the importance of variables tackmax and
tdelmax is explained in subsection II-A).
Receiver:
1) out put : f inite sequence  Frames ,
2) buffer :  0 	 1 	 N  1 
 snumber :  0 	 1 	 K  1 	
frn : Frames  ε 
 ,
3) lastdel :  0 	 1 	 K  1  ,
4) acklastdel : bool,
5) delmax : bool,
6) tdelmax : Time
The frame channel and the acknowledgment channel are
represented by its contents, namely a set of frame mes-
sages and a set of acknowledgment messages, respectively.
Besides a sequence number and possibly a frame, each
message includes its timeout, i.e. the latest time when it
must be removed from the channel. When a message is
sent, we assign as its timeout the current time plus Lmax,
where Lmax is the maximum message lifetime. Although
timeout is formally a part of a message, it is never used by
the recipient of this message.
FrameMessage:
1) snumber :  0 	 1 	 K  1  ,
2) frame : Frames,
3) timeout : Time
AckMessage:
1) snumber :  0 	 1 	 K  1  ,
2) timeout : Time
The complete state of the protocol consists of the sender,
the receiver and the two channels fchannel and achannel,
together with the variable time, indicating the current time.
State:
1) sender : Sender,
2) receiver : Receiver,
3) fchannel ﬀ FrameMessage,
4) achannel ﬀ AckMessage,
5) time : Time
The initial state of the protocol is defined below in a
rather obvious way. The only subtlety is the values of
tackmax, lastdel and tdelmax; they are initialized as 0,
but we can easily determine from other variables that these
values are initial and should not be used.
InitialState:
1) sender
1) input  arbitrary sequence o f f rames,
2) first  0,
3) ftsend  0,
4) tackmax  0
2) receiver
1) out put  empty sequence,
2) buffer ﬂﬁﬃ i :  0 	 1 	 N  1 
 :
 snumber  i 	 frn  ε 
 ,
3) lastdel  0,
4) acklastdel  FALSE ,
5) delmax  FALSE ,
6) tdelmax  0
3) fchannel  /0,
4) achannel  /0,
5) time  0
The protocol is specified by a state machine with 7
atomic actions: 1 general, 3 for the sender and 3 for the
receiver, where some actions have a parameter. Below we
show the precondition and the effect of each of them, using
some abbreviations and PVS-like notation. The precon-
dition is defined for an arbitrary state s0, which is trans-
formed according to the effect predicate to a new state
s1. In our specifications, the effect is given in an im-
perative style close to specifications of PVS, and operator
with is used to overwrite values of records and functions.
For instance, record of the form s1  s0 with  time : 
time  s0 
  t  indicates that in the new state s1, the vari-
able time is changed from its current value time  s0 
 to the
22
new value time  s0 
! t, and all other variables are left un-
changed. Operator rem  K 
 gives a remainder to a modu-
lus K, operator choose gives an arbitrary element from a
nonempty set, and i f  then  else operator and operators
on sets have a usual meaning.
Note that actions for sending and receiving messages
are nondeterministic, which can be noticed from the use
of " in their effect predicates. Actions for sending mes-
sages (send, resend and sendack) either add a message to
the channel (which models its successful sending) or let
the channel unchanged (which models loss of a message).
Actions for receiving messages (receiveack and receive)
either remove a message from the channel (which mod-
els its “normal” reception) or let the channel unchanged
(which models duplication of a message). Note that we
model reordering of messages by representing both chan-
nels by unordered sets.
B. The delay action
Action Delay  t 
 expresses the passing of t units of time.
The precondition of this action, using a “time-lock” con-
struction, ensures that any message in a channel is removed
from the channel before its timeout expires.
Delay(t)
Precondition:
ﬁ f m : f m # fchannel  s0 
$&%
time  s0 
! t  timeout  f m 
 ,
ﬁ am : am # achannel  s0 
&&%
time  s0 
! t  timeout  am 

Effect:
s1  s0 with  time :  time  s0 
' t 
C. Actions of the sender
The precondition ReuseZeroPre of action Send ex-
presses that sequence number 0 can only be reused after
more than Lmax time units has passed since the last ac-
knowledgment of sequence number K  1 (and only if all
preceding frames have already been acknowledged). The
precondition of action Resend allows to resend any frame
in the sending window that has been already sent. In the ef-
fect of action Receiveack, aset is a set of indices of frames
in the sending window that are acknowledged by the ac-
knowledgment message am. It is easy to see that this set
consists of at most one index.
Send
Precondition:
LET
ReuseZeroPre  s0 
ﬃ
 rem  K 
( ftsend  s0 

 0 & ftsend  s0 
*) 0 
&$%
 ftsend  s0 
& first  s0 
 &
time  s0 
+) tackmax  s0 
! Lmax 

IN
first  s0 
* ftsend  s0 
-, first  s0 
' N,
ReuseZeroPre  s0 

Effect:
LET
SendNS  s0 
 s0 with
 ftsend :  ftsend  s0 
! 1 
IN
s1  SendNS  s0 
 with
 fchannel :  fchannel  s0 

! rem  K 
( ftsend  s0 

.	
input  s0 
( ftsend  s0 

.	
time  s0 
! Lmax 
/0
" s1  SendNS  s0 

Resend(i)
Precondition:
i  first  s0 
 ,
i , ftsend  s0 

Effect:
s1  s0 with
 fchannel :  fchannel  s0 

! rem  K 
( i 
.	 input  s0 
( i 
.	 time  s0 
! Lmax 
/0
" s1  s0
Receiveack(am)
Precondition:
am # achannel  s0 

Effect:
LET
aset  s0 	 am 
12 j 3 j  f irst  s0 
 &
j , f tsend  s0 
 &
rem  K 
( j 
& snumber  am 

AND
RANS  s0 	 i 	 bk 
& s0 with
 first :  i 	
tackmax :  if bk  K  1 then time  s0 

else tackmax  s0 
4
IN
if aset  s0 	 am 
65 /0 then
s1  RANS  s0 	 choose  aset  s0 	 am 

' 1 	
snumber  am 

 with
 achannel :  achannel  s0 
!7- am 0
" s1  RANS  s0 	 choose  aset  s0 	 am 

' 1 	
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snumber  am 


else s1  s0 with
 achannel :  achannel  s0 
'7* am 0
" s1  s0
D. Actions of the receiver
The precondition of action Receive ensures that we can
only receive messages after more than Lmax time units has
passed since the last delivery of a frame with sequence
number K  1. In the effect of the Receive action, f set
is a set of indices in the receiving window into which the
frame from message f m can be inserted. It is easy to see
that this set consists of at most one index.
Receive(fm)
Precondition:
f m # f channel  s0 
 ,
delmax  s0 
&% time  s0 
+) tdelmax  s0 
! Lmax
Effect:
LET
f set  s0 	 f m 
12 j 3 j , N &
snumber  buffer  s0 
( j 

 snumber  f m 
 &
f rn  buffer  s0 
( j 

8 ε &
snumber  buffer  s0 
( j 

9 j 
AND
RNS  s0 	 bn 	 f r 
& s0 with
 bu f f er :  buffer  s0 
 with
: bn 
 : ; snumber  buffer  s0 
( bn 

.	 f r 
4:
IN
if f set  s0 	 f m 
<5 /0 then
s1  RNS  s0 	 choose  f set  s0 	 f m 

.	
f rame  f m 

 with
 fchannel :  fchannel  s0 
'7* f m 0
" s1  RNS  s0 	 choose  f set  s0 	 f m 

.	
f rame  f m 


else s1  s0 with
 fchannel :  fchannel  s0 
'7* f m 0
" s1  s0
Sendack
Precondition:
acklastdel  T RUE
Effect:
LET
SendackNS  s0 
 s0 with
 acklastdel :  if lastdel  s0 
 K  1
then FALSE else acklastdel  s0 
4
IN
s1  SendackNS  s0 
 with
 achannel :  achannel  s0 

! lastdel  s0 
.	 time  s0 
' Lmax 
/0
" s1  SendackNS  s0 

Deliver
Precondition:
frn  buffer  s0 
( 0 

5 ε
Effect:
s1  s0 with
 out put :  out put  s0 
 o one  f rn  buffer  s0 
( 0 


.	
buffer :  shi f t  buffer  s0 
.	
 rem  K 
( snumber  buffer  s0 
( N  1 

! 1 
.	 ε 

.	
lastdel :  snumber  buffer  s0 
( 0 

.	
acklastdel :  T RUE 	
delmax :  if snumber  buffer  s0 
( 0 

 K  1
then T RUE else delmax  s0 
.	
tdelmax :  if snumber  buffer  s0 
( 0 

 K  1
then time  s0 
 else tdelmax  s0 
4
Here for a frame f r, one  f r 
 denotes the sequence of
frames of length one with the only element f r; o is the op-
erator that performs concatenation of two finite sequences
of frames; and shi f t is the operator that removes the first
element of a buffer and adds another element to its end, i.e.
for a buffer buff with N elements and a buffer element be,
the expression shi f t  buff 	 be 
 is defined as follows:
shi f t  buff 	 be 
=ﬂﬁﬃ i :  0 	 1 	 N  1 
 :
if i , N  1 then buff  i  1 
 else be
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION
A. Correctness condition
An execution of our protocol, or a run, is represented
by an infinite sequence of the form s0
a0
 s1
a1
>::
ai ? 1
 si
ai

si @ 1
ai A 1
B:: , where si are states, ai are executed actions, s0 is
the initial state, each si satisfies the precondition of ai, and
every pair  si 	 si @ 1 
 corresponds to the effect of ai (where
initial state, precondition and effect are defined in the pre-
vious section). As we already explained, a SW protocol
is correct with respect to safety, if the receiver always de-
livers the frames to the receiving host in the same order
in which they appear in the input sequence. In our model,
we prefer to define the correctness property in terms of
states rather than actions. Note that in each state, frames
that have already been delivered to the receiving host are
represented by the output sequence. Therefore, the safety
property for a particular state s can be expressed by a pred-
icate, which says that the output sequence is the prefix of
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the input sequence:
Sa f e  s 
$Cﬁ i : i , length  out put  s 

+&%
out put  s 
( i 
* input  s 
( i 

Let st  r 
 and act  r 
 denote the sequence of states and
sequence of actions of a run r, respectively. A run r can
now be defined as correct, if each state in this run satisfies
the safety property.
Sa f ety  r 
Dﬁ i : Sa f e  st  r 
( i 


In the next subsection, we outline how to prove
Sa f ety  r 
 for each run of our protocol. All our proofs are
done with the interactive theorem prover PVS, so below
we show some mathematical proofs “extracted” from the
PVS proofs.
B. Proof of correctness condition
We need to prove the following theorem:
ﬁ r	 i : Sa f e  st  r 
( i 

 Main
The proof is based on the following important invari-
ant OriginOK, in which bn is a variable for an integer not
greater than N  1, bu f f er is the buffer of the receiver,
and function LO gives the length of the output sequence in
a particular state:
ﬁ r	 i 	 bn : f rn  bu f f er  st  r 
( i 

( bn 
E
F5 ε &%
f rn  bu f f er  st  r 
( i 
E
( bn 

9
input  st  r 
( i 

( LO  st  r 
( i 

' bn 
 OriginOK
Invariant OriginOK determines the “origin” of each
frame in the buffer of the receiver: a frame in the position
bk was sent by the sender from the position in the input se-
quence, equal to the sum of bk and the current length of the
output sequence. Assuming OriginOK, it is easy to prove
theorem Main.
Proof of Main. First, we prove that all actions of our pro-
tocol don’t change the input sequence. Now let r be an
arbitrary run. The proof is by induction on the length of
the output. If it is equal to 0, the statement is trivially
true. Now suppose that the theorem is proved for any out-
put length not greater than k, and that we are in the state
with index i such that LO  st  r 
( i 

9 k  1. It is easy to
see that action Deliver increases the length of the out-
put exactly by one, and all other actions of our protocol
don’t change the output. Therefore, there exists index l
such that l , i, LO  st  r 
( l 

* k, act  r 
( l 
* Deliver and
out put  st  r 
( l  1 

 out put  st  r 
( i 

 . By the induction
hypothesis, it follows that in state st  r 
( l 
 , the input is the
prefix of the output. We can now apply invariant OriginOK
for r, l and 0, and obtain that the frame delivered by
action act  r 
( l 
 originates from position LO  st  r 
( l 

 in
the input. Thus in state st  r 
( l 
 , output includes frames
input  0 
 , input  1 
 , ... input  LO  st  r 
( l 

G 1 
 , and frame
input  LO  st  r 
( l 


 is added to it by action act  r 
( l 
 .
Therefore, in states st  r 
( l  1 
 and st  r 
( i 
 the output is
still the prefix of the input, and this completes the proof.
To prove invariant OriginOK, the following important
invariants AckOK and FrOK are needed:
ﬁ r	 i : f irst  st  r 
( i 

 LO  st  r 
( i 

 AckOK
Intuitively, invariant AckOK means “we cannot receive
acknowledgments for frames that are not acknowledged
yet”. Indeed, the value of f irst is equal to the number of
frames for which acknowledgments from the receiver have
been received. But the receiver acknowledges only those
frames which it had already delivered, and all such frames
are included in the output. Therefore, f irst can become
greater than the length of the output only if the sender re-
ceives some acknowledgments more than once.
ﬁ r	 i 	 bn : f rn  bu f f er  st  r 
( i 

0 bn 

F5 ε &%
LO  st  r 
( i 

' bn , f tsend  st  r 
( i 

 FrOK
Intuitively, invariant FrOK means “we cannot receive
frames that are not sent yet”. Indeed, if the buffer of the
sender has a frame in position bn, it implies that at least
LO  st  r 
( i 

 bn  1 frames have been sent by the sender,
but the exact number of such frames is represented by vari-
able f tsend. Therefore, the invariant can only be violated
if the receiver receives some frames more than once.
Together, invariants AckOK and FrOK mean that the
length of the output is always very close to the borders
of the sending window. Despite the clear intuitive mean-
ing of these invariants, it turned out very difficult to prove
them in PVS, and we are still working on their proofs. In
this paper, we assume these invariants to be true, and show
how to use them to prove invariant OriginOK. Below we
give a brief sketch of the proof, which is based on dozens
of PVS lemmas.
Proof of OriginOK. Let’s consider arbitrary r, i and bn,
and suppose there is a frame in the buffer of the sender in
position bn. It is easy to prove that as long as a frame stays
in the buffer, the sum of its position and the length of the
output remains the same. Therefore, we can assume with-
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out loss of generality that this frame has just been put into
the buffer, i.e. action act  r 
( i  1 
 is a receive action that
receives message with frame f rn  bu f f er  st  r 
( i 

0 bn 


from the channel. It is also easy to prove that a frame in
position bn has a sequence number rem  K 
( LO  st  r 
( i 

H
bn 
 . Thus in state st  r 
( i  1 
 , the frame channel in-
cludes a message with frame f rn  bu f f er  st  r 
( i 

0 bn 


and sequence number rem  K 
( LO  st  r 
( i 

* bn 
 . We
can prove that each message in the frame channel
was sent by the sender at some moment in the past.
This implies that the message originates from some
frame with position j in the input sequence, and from
the way in which messages are constructed we ob-
tain input  st  r 
( i 

( j 
I f rn  bu f f er  st  r 
( i 

( bn 

 and
rem  K 
( j 
 rem  K 
( LO  st  r 
( i 

$ bn 
 . To finish the
proof, it is now sufficient to show j  LO  st  r 
( i 

' bn.
It is easy to see that j , f tsend  st  r 
( i  1 

 . We can
also prove f tsend  st  r 
( i  1 

 j  K. Indeed, it is ob-
vious that in state st  r 
( i  1 
 , all frames in positions from
j  1 to f tsend  st  r 
( i  1 

& 1 have already been sent.
If f tsend  st  r 
( i  1 

J j ) K, then there are at least K
such positions, so at least one of them has a remainder 0
with respect to K. Thus after sending the frame in position
j, we sent a frame with sequence number 0 at least once.
But our protocol waits for Lmax time units before resend-
ing sequence number 0, and this ensures that by the time
of this resending all preceding messages disappear from
the channel. Contradiction, because in state st  r 
( i  1 

we received a message originating from position j in the
input.
Now we use invariants AckOK and FrOK. Invari-
ant FrOK implies LO  st  r 
( i 

$ bn , f tsend  st  r 
( i 

 .
Invariant AckOK gives f irst  st  r 
( i 

K LO  st  r 
( i 

 .
We know that f tsend  st  r 
( i 

L f irst  st  r 
( i 

M N.
This implies f tsend  st  r 
( i 

FN LO  st  r 
( i 

O bn 
P
N. Action act  r 
( i  1 
 is not a send action, so
we have LO  st  r 
( i 

- bn , f tsend  st  r 
( i  1 

 and
f tsend  st  r 
( i  1 

K LO  st  r 
( i 

Q bn 
6 N. Compar-
ing this with our results about j, we obtain that both j and
LO  st  r 
( i 

R bn are less than f tsend  st  r 
( i  1 

 , and
the difference between each of them and f tsend  st  r 
( i 
1 

 is not greater than K. Therefore the difference between
j and LO  st  r 
( i 

J bn is less than K. But we already
know that these two numbers have the same remainder
with respect to K. Thus they are equal, and this completes
the proof.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We presented the formal specification and verification
of the Sliding Window protocol for transport channels. As
explained in the introduction, our version of the proto-
col offers a significant improvement over some previously
published versions, and can potentially be used as a part of
the TCP protocol. Unlike some previous papers, our mod-
elling of the protocol is very general, and the verification
is supported by the interactive theorem prover PVS. Our
work on the verification helped us to obtain an increased
insight into the protocol, and to discover and to eliminate
a surprising erroneous scenario in an earlier version of the
protocol (see subsection II-A), which otherwise could have
been left unnoticed.
In the immediate future, we plan to finish the PVS proof
outlined in section IV. As a part of our future work, we
also would like to specify and verify a simplified version
of our protocol for data link channels, and to compare both
specifications and proofs with the more general protocol
for transport channels. Finally, we are also interested in the
study of liveness properties for Sliding Window protocols
and their formal verification.
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